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"GREEN HELMETS": A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITY 
COUNCIL AUTHORITY IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL EMERGENCIES 
Linda A. Malone • 
Although 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the birth of the 
United Nations, the year also marks the fifth anniversary of a newly 
revitalized Security Council.· In this period of five years, scholarly 
debate on the Security Council has shifted from what it might do if it 
could act to what substantive limits, if any, exist on the Security Coun-
cil's authority to act under the Charter. The legitimacy of the Security 
Council's authority under the Charter arises both in its initial determina-
tion of when it can act and in its determination of the appropriate scope 
of its actions once it has involved itself in an international dispute. 
Given the wide ranging scope of situations that might fall within the 
undefined parameters of a "threat to the peace" under Chapter VII1 and 
the even more discretionary language of Chapter Vl,2 it is not surprising 
that on this anniversary much of the focus for reform of the Council has 
involved the procedural checks on Security Council decisionmaking -
specifically, membership in the Council, voting procedures, and the veto 
power.3 Concerns about the legitimacy of Security Council action most 
often arise when it appears that its decisions are driven by the more 
powerful veto-holding states of the Security Council, particularly the 
United States, rather than reflecting a global consensus that Security 
Council action is necessary or advisable.4 On the other hand, as Profes-
sor David Caron recently noted, there is no denying that the United 
States' resources are the linchpin to effective implementation of Security 
Council directives, at least with respect to collective actions.5 
• Marshall-Wythe Foundation Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary 
School of Law; LL.M., University of Illinois College of Law (1984); J.D., Duke Law School 
(1978); B.A., Vassar CoBege (1975). The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of 
Raj Bhala and Gunther Handl on earlier drafts of this article; 
I. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. 
2. /d. art. 34. 
3. See, e.g., John M. Goshko, U.N. Moves Toward Redesign of Security Council, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 29, 1995, at All. 
4. See David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 565-66 (1992). 
5. /d. at 563-65. 
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New models for membership and reform of the veto are not the only 
methodologies that can strengthen the perceived legitimacy of Security 
Council actions. If the overriding concern of the global community is 
that the Security Council is responsive to the concerns of a select group 
of states rather than that of the community, another avenue of reform 
would be to utilize the Security Council more effectively in addressing 
new types of concerns widely shared by the community. One such easily 
identifiable set of concerns revolves around the threat and effects of 
environmental disasters. These are concerns that are shared by devel-
oped and developing countries alike, although the sense of helplessness 
in responding adequately to an environmental disaster is perhaps more 
acutely felt in developing countries.6 
In 1991, the United Nations Environmental Programme ("UNEP"), 
in response to mounting disquietude over environmental security, estab-
lished the United Nations Center for Urgent Environmental Assistance 
("UNCUEA") to assess and respond to man-made environmental emer-
gencies in cooperation with other United Nations agertcies.7 In April 
1993, the executive director of UNCUEA submitted a report summariz-
ing and evaluating its activities and experiences.8 On May 21, 1993, 
UNEP's Governing Council decided to extend the experimental period 
of UNCUEA until June 1994, during which time the Center was to 
identify specific needs of countries faced with different types of envi-
ronmental emergencies, analyze the ability of the United Nations and 
other organizations to respond, review the major disasters of the last ten 
years to identify gaps in responses to them, and develop concrete pro-
posals for an enhanced international response capacity focusing on the 
United Nations system in particular.9 Following that decision, an adviso-
ry meeting of developed and developing countries was held in Novem-
ber 1993 to discuss the future role of the Center. 10 In the course of that 
meeting there was much discussion of a report based upon responses to 
a questionnaire that had been sent to all developing countries. The report 
concluded that many developing countries had no ability to respond to 
environmental emergencies. In fact, a. routine chemical accident in a 
developed country could escalate to a major disaster in a country with-
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-15. 
7. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., 79th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 77, U.N. Doc. 
NRES/46/217 (1992). 
8. 1993 U.N.Y.B. 812, U.N. Sales No. E.94.1.1. 
9. /d. 
10. Advisory Meeting Discusses UN Role in Combatting Environmental Emergencies 
HE/834, Nov. 24, 1993 at 1, available online at URL <gopher://gopher.undp.org:70/00/ 
uncurr/press_releases/HE/93_111834> [hereinafter Environmental Emergencies]. 
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out the knowledge or equipment to deal with the situation. 11 The report 
noted anxiety that as industrialization increased throughout the develop-
ing world, so would the environmental risks, particularly the risk of 
chemical disasters. In response to the questionnaire, more than fifty 
countries said they needed the aid of the United Nations to respond to 
the growing number of chemical accidents that were polluting water, 
killing ecosystems, and endangering human health. 12 Most countries said 
they needed rapid access to information on the dangers of the chemicals 
to humans and the environment as well as procedures for containing and 
cleaning up chemical accidents. 13 The case studies and report noted that 
inappropriate action by poorly informed response teams could actually 
make matters worse than the original emergency. 14 Although help was 
available from countries on a bilateral basis, several countries indicated 
that they simply did not know what assistance was available or whom 
they should call. 15 
The report also referenced the findings of three independent consul-
tant studies. These independent studies predicted that environmental 
emergencies were likely to increase in both frequency and magnitude in 
the developing world as industrialization and population increased. 16 The 
· report determined that the ideal system to cope with accidents was for 
countries to be self-sufficient. Until that time, however, it emphasized 
that there was a serious need for practical support from the international 
communityY Alain Clerc, the Center's coordinator, contended that there 
was a fundamental need for developed countries to show solidarity with 
the developing world and help them to cope with the inevitable acci-
dents. 18 The Center aimed to fill some of the gaps in communication by 
extending the twenty-four hour response "switchboard" at the Geneva-
based Department of Humanitarian Affairs ("DHA") to allow developing 
countries to phone the United Nations directly for advice in responding 
to a chemical emergency}9 The switchboard would be supplemented 
with a register of international expertise and specialist equipment from 
participating developed countries who were prepared to send their 
resources to a country facing an environmental disaster. The plans of 
11. /d. 
12. /d. at 2. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 1. 
17. /d. at 2. 
18. /d. 
19. /d. 
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UNCUEA called for training in chemical emergency management, the 
provision of manuals in a form suitable for initial response, and encour-
aging countries to help each other through bilateral agreements.20 
UNCUEA's Geneva-based secretariat would also draw on information 
coming from other UNEP activities, including the International Register 
of Potentially Toxic Chemicals ("IRPTC"), the secretariat to the Basel 
Convention on Transboundary Shipment of Toxic Waste, and programs 
of the International Program on Chemical Safety ("IPCS").21 The report 
noted that there is no targeted United Nations capacity to respond to 
environmental emergencies on land, and that surely it is not necessary to 
wait for "another Bhopal" to help the countries who need it most.22 
On December 21, 1993, on the recommendation of the Second 
Committee on economic and financial issues, the General Assembly 
adopted without a vote a resolution inviting governments, related orga-
nizations of the United Nations system, and other relevant entities to 
review their contribution to international cooperative efforts in environ-
mental monitoring and to provide appropriate support for such activi-
ties.23 Despite these calls for expanded United Nations involvement in 
responding to environmental emergencies, UNCUEA was ultimately 
dissolved in 1994 and its responsibilities were transferred to a joint 
UNEP and Department of Human Affairs project, denominated the Joint 
UNEP/DHA Environment Unit.24 The first meeting of its Advisory 
Group on Environmental Emergencies was held in January 1995. A 
multinational team, organized under the Unit's auspices, assisted Russia 
in assessing the harm from the massive oil spill in the Republic of 
Komi.25 
Momentum for the United Nations' involvement in responding to 
environmental emergencies is not limited to developing countries. In 
April 1992, in a follow-up conference to the 1992 United Nations Con-
ference on the Environment and Development, Switzerland advocated 
the establishment of a "Green Cross" organization to provide assistance 
in environmental disasters in much the same way as the Red Cross cur-
20. /d. 
21. Continued U.N. Emergency Response Role in Environment Disasters Backed at 
CONFAB, Nov. 30, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Bnaied File. 
22. Environmental Emergencies, supra note 10, at 3. 
23. G.A. Res. 192, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 86th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 99(a), at 2, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/192 (1993). 
24. On-Line Interview with Isabelle Prudon, United Nations Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (Dec. 13, 1995) (on file with Michigan Journal of International lAw). 
25. /d. 
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rently does with humanitarian aid.26 A French news report at the time, 
however, noted that the Swiss government seemed unlikely to offer the 
project much backing, and that third world governments might be reluc-
tant to delegate such responsibility for environmental affairs to a devel-
oped western nation.27 In May 1992, Germany and Switzerland (support-
ed by thirteen other countries) proposed the creation of National Envi-
ronmental Task Forces, called "Green Helmets," to respond to environ-
mental emergencies .. This proposal was made at a follow-up meeting of 
the fifty-two nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) held in Helsinki. Under this proposal, the CSCE countries 
would set up national environmental task forces that would serve as the 
basis for coordinated international assistance within the framework of 
UNCUEA. The CSCE countries would also be obliged to give the 
Center information on potentially hazardous installations in their own 
territories. Supporters of the proposal included Bulgaria, Canada, Den-
mark, Spain, France, Greece, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Russia, Czechoslovakia, and Ukraine. The Netherlands and Norway also 
provided their support, but said that the forces should be given even 
more responsibilities and power than suggested in the proposal.28 
In March 1989, representatives of twenty-four countries adopted the 
Hague Declaration.29 While only evaluating two global threats- global 
warming and ozone depletion - the Hague Declaration nevertheless 
asserts that: 
[t]he right to live is the right from which all other rights stem. 
Guaranteeing this right is the paramount duty of those in charge of 
all States throughout the world .... 
Therefore we consider that, faced with a problem the solution 
to which has three salient features, namely that it is vital, urgent 
and global, we are in a situation that calls not only for implementa-
tion of existing principles but also for a new approach, through the 
development of new principles of international law including new 
26. Swiss Environmentalists Would Like to See "Green Cross", Agence France Presse, 
Apr. 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. 
27. /d. 
28. Green Helmets Proposed for Europe, Agence France Presse, May 20, 1992, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP File. 
29. The signatories to the Hague Declaration are the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Ivory Coast, Australia, Egypt, Brazil, Spain, Canada, France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malta, Norway, New Zealand, Senegal, Sweden, Tunisia, Netherlands, 
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. Hague Declaration on the Environment, Mar. II, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 
1308 (1989). 
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and more effective decision-making and enforcement mecha-
nisms.30 
UNEP is hampered by a limited secretariat, a relatively small budget, a 
headquarters (in Nairobi) distant from most of the agencies it coordi-
nates as well as the United Nations decisionmak:ing centers in New York 
and Geneva, and, most importantly for purposes of this analysis, no 
enforcement powers. 31 Despite the proliferation of multilateral treaties on 
the environment, there is no collective institutional mechanism to coerce 
or cajole compliance with the new norms established. 
The Security Council has noted its probable jurisdiction and correc-
tive powers over certain environmental conflicts. In a summit meeting of 
the Council on January 31, 1992, the Council's final declaration provid-
ed that "[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does 
not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military 
sources of instability· in the economic, humanitarian and ecological 
fields may become a threat to peace and security."32 The analytical 
dilemma created in advocating an authoritative role for the Security 
Council in any substantive context other than military conflict is that 
military conflict,. or the threat thereof, is the paradigm upon which the 
Security Council's authorization was predicated in the drafting of the 
Charter. Whatever might be gained in perceived legitimacy by having 
the Security Council activated in an area of universal concern might 
well be lost if that authority can only be sustained by forced interpreta-
tion of already expansive terms. Legitimacy is first and foremost depen-
dent upon the legal predicate for Security Council responsiveness. 
In a challenging piece on restructuring the international organiza-
tional framework to address international environmental problems, Paul 
Szasz wrote in 1992 that the argument for assigning to the Security 
Council those matters related to environmental management, particularly 
matters dealing with emergency situations or "otherwise serious situa-
tions," has· two bases. First, critical environmental problems are "securi-
ty" issues as much as war and peace. Second, the Council is unique in 
its power to compel states to comply with its decrees or suffer the 
consequences of sanctions.33 Finding both premises unpersuasive, Szasz 
30. /d. at 1308-09. 
31. See generally Paul C. Szasz, Restructuring the International Organizational Frame-
work, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 340, 352 (Edith B. Weiss ed., 
1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE]; Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make Interna-
tional Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 261 (1992). 
32. Szasz, supra note 31, at 360 n.60 (alteration in original). 
33. /d. at 359. 
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first notes that the original meaning of the language of the Charter as to 
what constitutes a breach of peace or threat to peace does not easily 
lend itself to addressing environmental emergencies; and that the "classi-
cal rules of treaty interpretation require that in dealing with duties or 
burdens imposed on States Parties to a treaty a strict rather than a liberal 
construction be applied."34 Second, he posits that the use of Chapter VII 
to deal with environmental concerns would be comparable to "using an 
inappropriate instrument 'to perform a potentially delicate operation -
perhaps it can be pulled off successfully, but it certainly would not be 
either the surgeon's or the patient's choice."35 He does, however, con-
cede that utilization of the Security Council may be more practical than 
a treaty assigning true legislative powers to the United Nations or to a 
new international organization, or an amendment of the ·Charter to 
explicitly address environmental concerns.36 · 
Despite the references to Chapter VII in this brief passage, Szasz's 
focus· is on the potential of established United Nations organs to serve 
normative needs in environmental management. The argument for such 
legislative power under Article 25 and Chapter VII would be predicated 
on particular environmentally destructive practices constituting a threat 
to peace and the authority of the Security Council to forbid all states 
from engaging in that practice.37 The "principal difficulty" in his opin-
ion, however, is that the composition and voting system of the Council 
are not suited to environmental tasks: 
Even aside from the question whether [the Security Council] 
composition and ... system are still appropriate even for the func-
tions for which the Council was originally designed, it would seem 
absurd if at this time this completely different function (i.e. envi-
ronmental protection) would be subjected to a system in which the 
five states who were the principal victors in the Second World War 
(but which do not include two of· the most powerful economies, 
those of Germany and Japan) would ha~e a veto power over envi-
ronmental enforcement actions. It may indeed by sensible.and even 
necessary that any such compulsory powers not be easily exercised 
. and that therefore one or more states or groups of states should be 
able to prevent such exercise by a veto, but the states and the 
particular voting powers that one would assign them would pre-
sumably be quite different from those specified in Articles 23 and 
27 of the Charter. 
34. ld. at 359-60. 
35. /d. at 360. 
36. ld. 
37. ld. at 360 & n.62. 
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Consequently, to the extent that a Charter amendment would 
be required to give the Security Council responsibilities in respect 
of the enforcement of environmental rules or the prevention of 
environmental violations, it would seem more sensible, if it is 
desired to vest such powers in a UN organ, to create a new princi-
ple organ for that purpose .... 
On these several grounds, there is no reason to try to involve 
the Security Council either in the process of environmental legisla-
tion or even in considering and debating such issues. Although it is 
true that the Council enjoys possibly the highest visibility among 
UN organs, it would seem likely that instead of enhancing environ-
mental issues with its prestige it would find its own role dimin-
ished by dealing with matters for which it is clearly unsuited.38 
In a landmark article also published in 1992, Sir Geoffrey Palmer ex-
pressed skepticism about the normative authority of any existing interna-
tional organization, as presently structured, to deal with environmental 
matters. He favors creation of a new United Nations organ, although he 
notes that the procedures for amending the Charter are not "easy" and 
are further hampered by the veto option.39 Even in his more modest 
proposal to create a new specialized United Nations agency, he predicts 
that "[m]any nations, particularly the most powerful and certainly the 
United States, are likely to be opposed to creation of such an organiza-
tion[,] ... [given the apparent consensus] that the creation of new 
institutions should be avoided when possible."40 
In assessing global expectations for the legitimacy of Security 
Council authority in environmental management, careful distinction 
should be made between the Security Council's putative authority to act 
in formulating norms and its authority to recommend or impose remedi-
al or punitive measures on a specific party or parties. The global com-
munity's perception of the legitimacy of Security Council action in these 
formats would inevitably differ. The Security Council's agenda and 
discussions relative to avoiding or terminating military conflict are 
driven by specific, concrete events to which the Security Council re-
sponds. In devising environmental norms, however, the Security Council 
would be evaluating certain anti-environmental practices as a general 
matter and establishing a norm that either recommends that such practic-
es be discontinued under Chapter VI or prohibits the practices under 
38. Szasz, supra note 31, at 361. 
39. Palmer, supra note 31, at 280. 
40. ld. at 282. 
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Chapter Vll.41 The difference between the Security Council's normative 
functioning in environmental management and its more traditional 
functioning with respect to international peace and security under Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII would be less an issue of practice and more one 
of perceived legitimacy. Discussion of a matter in the Security Council 
may be limited to a single concrete dispute yet result in a general reso-
lution without reference to the specifics of the dispute or to any specific 
parties. In much the same way, evaluation of the permissibility of envi-
ronmentally destructive practices would inevitably involve discussion of 
specific factual circumstances and situations although ultimately result-
ing in a general normative resolution. The most important question is 
the willingness of the global community to accept the Security Council's 
claim to legislative authority, regardless of the substantive context 
(environmental or otherwise) in which that authority is asserted. 
Legitimization of Security Council authority in environmental man-
agement can and should begin with the relatively modest, but compel-
ling, proposal that environmental emergencies be absorbed into its 
sphere of activity. The Security Council was originally devised and 
organized to function continuously and to respond to international 
emergencies (although, concededly, with respect to military conflict). 
Defining what constitutes an "emergency" from an environmental per-
spective is ordinarily difficult. When is a disaster imminent? What is the 
interplay between imminency and scientific certainty or lack thereof? In 
the circumambiency of reformulating the international organizational 
framework to acknowledge the Security Council's emergency authority, 
however, an environmental emergency can be presumed to be any action 
which creates or threatens significant transboundary environmental 
damage or loss of a vital global resource which cannot be adequately 
addressed to ensure a safe and healthful environment by any other orga-
nization due to time or authority constraints. In this respect, the prece-
dent set by Security Council action in just the past three years has 
dramatically altered the legal foundations for arguing that the Security 
Council has legitimate remedial and punitive authority in environmental 
emergencies. One need look no further than the 1990 Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and the Kuwaiti oil fires to conclude that environmental destruc-
tion outside the permissible bounds of the laws of warfare constitutes an 
act of aggression, breach of peace, or threat to international peace and 
security. 42 
41. See Szasz, supra note 31, at 360 n.62. 
42. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 
(1991). See also Linda A. Malone, Discussion in the Security Council on Environmental 
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In the absence of real or threatened military conflict, can environ-
mental destruction be sufficient to trigger the Council's ·Chapter VII 
powers? Is a threat to ecological security a threat to international peace 
and security? As noted earlier, the Security Council has declared that 
"[t]he absence of war and military conflicts amongst states does not in 
itself ensure international peace and security[,] ... non-military sources 
of instability in the economic, humanitarian and ecological fields may 
become a threat to peace and security."43 Alexandre Timoshenko makes 
a compelling argument for recognition of ecological security as a legal 
principle and the need for relevant improvements in the legal and insti-
tutional order to address such concerns, attributing the concept of eco-
logical security to leaders and diplomats from the former Soviet Union 
and Eastern European countries.44 
According to Timoshenko, the concept of ecological security provides 
a needed methodology for environmental protection in several respects: 
Firstly, ecological security makes environmental protection a 
problem of human survival, reflecting the seriousness of existing 
and future ecological threats. It gives the problem the highest 
priority traditionally attributed to security matters. It introduces a 
new basis for resolving environmental problems - the "forecast-
and-prevent" model -· instead of the usual "react-and-correct" 
model. It creates an opportunity to redistribute resources allocated 
for security in favour of environmental tasks, thus it may help to 
solve the problem of reconverting the military sector of national 
economies. 
Secondly, ecological security envisages that the obligation to 
create the relevant legal and managerial regime will be placed upon 
the international community as a whole, which coincides with such 
general trends in international law as collective responsibilities and 
obligations erga omnes. 
Thirdly, being a component of the comprehensive security 
system, ecological security functions in conjunction with other 
elements (military, political, economic, and humanitarian). This not 
only creates a needed correlation between ecological security and 
other global problems, but also conditions the achievement of a 
synergistic effect. 
Intervention in Ukraine, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 893 (1994); Margaret T. Okorodudu-Fubara, 
Oil in the Persian Gulf War: Legal Appraisal of an Environmental Warfare, 23 ST. MARY'S 
L.J. 123, 216-17 (1991). 
43. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
44. Alexandre S. Timoshenko, Ecological Security: Response to Global Challenges, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 31, at 413. 
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And lastly, the security approach in the environmental field 
serves to integrate related concerns under a common rubric. Securi-
ty has often served as a strong motivation for integration. The 
universal collective security system under the United Nations 
Charter and regional security systems like NATO or the Warsaw 
Treaty illustrate this. This integrative force greatly enhances the 
efficiency of environmental protection. This has been clearly dem-
onstrated by the European Communities.45 
However appealing this equation of ecological security and military 
security might be for purposes of Chapter VII, parity of these concerns 
could lead to expanded assertions of state authority to engage in unilat-
eral or collective measures. Otherwise illegitimate intervention and use 
of armed force could be cloaked as ecological self-help or self-defense. 
This would undermine the Charter's restrictive authorization of armed 
force by ~tates in Article 51.46 Although recognition of ecological securi-
ty under Chapter VII does not necessarily .open a Pandora's box, the 
danger of abuse merits consideration of other analytical frameworks. 
When environmental degradation seems to threaten international 
conflict between states or takes place in an ongoing military conflict, 
there would be no need to resort to a separate notion of ecological 
security in order to trigger authority in the Security Council under 
Chapter VII. Furthermore, Article V of the 1977 Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques directs states to file a "complaint" with the 
Security Council if there is reason to believe the treaty is being violat-
ed.47 States are additionally required to cooperate in any investigation 
45. /d. at 432-33. From a political perspective, Timoshenko notes that: 
ecological security can be considered in three dimensions. The first derives from 
the environmental threat to political and economic stability. The second is based on 
the assumption that the inter-state disputes, arising from transboundary pollution or 
abuse of one's right to use shared natural resources, may develop into military 
conflicts. The third originates from the supposition that overreaching ecological 
imbalances may cause severe disruption of major natural processes that are 
indispensible to human existence on the planet. 
The first two dimensions are primarily of a national and regional scale. The 
last and the most serious one has global implications. The best available example 
of the third dimension of ecological security is global climate change. 
ld. at 422-23. 
46. Nico Schrijver, International Organization for Environmental Security, 20 BULL. 
PEACE PROPOSALS 115, 116 (1989). 
47. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmen- · 
tal Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, art. V, 'll 3, 31 U.S.T. 333; 16 I.L.M. 88. 
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the Security Council initiates,48 and are presumably subject to the enforce-
ment powers of the Council under Chapter VII for non-compliance. 
In the milieu of deliberate environmental destruction or ecocide, the 
General Assembly has a pivotal role to play. The definition of "aggres-
sion" adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1974 is con-
fined to the use of military force. 49 Although ecocide may be deemed a 
threat to peace or breach of peace, such intentional and hostile manipu-
lation of the environment should be added to the list of acts of aggres-
sion found in Article 3. 
Absent real or potential military conflict, there are many conceivable 
scenarios in which the state of origin of an environmental disaster might 
be unwilling to cooperate with the Security Council, thereby exacerbat-
ing the trans boundary effects of an environmental disaster and jeopardiz-
ing the lives of its own populace by refusing to cooperate with the 
international community in remedial action. In such circumstances, the 
traditional notion of a threat to international peace and security would 
not justify invocation of Chapter VII in the absence of an ongoing 
conflict between states or a realistic threat of such conflict. The concept 
of ecological security is more compelling in these circumstances because 
the traditional analysis is deficient. The full implication of recognizing 
ecological security as a basis for Security Council action merits further 
consideration of alternative justifications. Once again, recent exercises of 
the Security Council's Chapter VII powers have resulted in more expan-
sive interpretation of the concept of a "threat to the peace" than previ-
ously was the case. 
Security Council enforcement action with respect to preservation of 
human rights and relief efforts is analogous to Security Council enforce-
ment action to protect individuals from environmental catastrophes. For 
example, the humanitarian mission to Somalia,50 the economic sanctions 
and authorization of a multinational force for Haiti,51 the placement of 
48. /d. '14. 
49. G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 2319th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 
(1975). The General Assembly addresses environmental management in its overburdened 
Second Committee on economic and financial issues. It has issued a resolution giving specific 
programmatic and administrative guidance to UNEP in preparation for environmental emer-
gencies. G.A. Res. 217, supra note 7. Of course, it also convened the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment from which UNEP originated and the 1992 Rio 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). 
50. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 314th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 
(1992). 
51. S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 328th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 
(1993). 
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relief operations in Iraqi territory for the Kurdish population,52 and the 
establishment of the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda53 and 
the former Yugoslavia54 are examples of humanitarian intervention by 
the Security Council in order to remedy gross and systematic depriva-
tion of human rights. Gross and systematic deprivation of human rights 
is no more within the original intent of the term "threat to the peace" 
than environmental preservation. Although each of these precedents 
(with the notable exception of Haiti) can be legitimized by pointing to· 
the background conflicts present, such a position would ignore the 
humanitarian justifications given in the relevant resolutions for the 
Security Council's actions. These examples indicate that the Security 
Council members, and the global community, are at least somewhat 
receptive to a policy-oriented, constitutive approach to interpreting the 
Charter even when such interpretation expands the obligations and 
duties of member states and undeniably goes beyond the original intent 
of the Charter. At the same time, the financial difficulties of the United 
Nations appear to have increased resistance to creating new organs. 
These practical considerations make the prospects dim for creation of 
new organs to protect the environment, intensifying the need for the 
Security Council to take an expansive and active role within the powers 
it possesses. 
Any analogy to the Security Council's exercise of humanitarian 
intervention under Chapter VII is complicated by the fact that, under 
international law, there has yet to be clear and unequivocal recognition 
of a right to a safe and healthful environment. 55 This lack of recognition 
52. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2982d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 
(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 858 (1991). 
53. S.C. Res. 995, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 
(1994). 
54. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 'll'lll-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 
(1993). 
55. See W. Paul Gormley, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (1976); Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1991); Gudmundur Alfredson & Alexander Ovsiouk, Human Rights 
and the Environment, 60 NORD. J. INT'L L. 19 (1991); Noralee Gibson, The Right to a Clean 
Environment, 54 SASK. L. REV. 5 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The Legal Obligation of the 
International Community to Guarantee a Pure and Decent Environment: The Expansion of 
Human Rights Norms, 3 GEo. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 85 (1990); W. Paul Gormley, The Right 
to a Safe and Decent Environment, 28 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1988); W. Paul Gormley, The 
Right of Individuals to be Guaranteed a Pure, Clean and Decent Environment: Future Pro-
grams of the Council of Europe, 1 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 23 (1975); Gunther 
Hand!, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly "Revisionist" View, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT 117 (A. Cancado 
Trindade ed., 1992); lveta Hodkova, Is There a Right to a Healthy Environment in the 
International Legal Order?, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 65 (1991); R.S. Pathak, The Human Rights 
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is particularly troublesome in that whatever authority the Security Coun-
cil might have under Chapter VII, the scope of its activities is confined 
by the stated purposes of the United Nations in Article 1.56 Article 1 
explicitly mentions human rights as one of the fundamental purposes of 
the United Nations, coextensive with the maintenance of international 
peace and security. Absent a threat to military peace and security or 
recognition of the concept of ecological security, legitimacy of any 
Security Council measures to protect the environment on humanitarian 
grounds will be attenuated so long as there is no explicit and clear 
recognition of a fundamental right to a safe and healthful environment. 
It is unfortunate that UNCED did not take this critical step forward. 57 
Indeed, the Rio Declaration's repeated proclamation of the sovereign 
right of a state to exploit its own resources is less supportive of a corre-
lation between environmental preservation and human rights than the 
earlier Stockholm Declaration. 58 · 
The inextricability of environmental preservation and human rights, 
as well as the need for Security Council involvement in environmental 
management, is well illustrated by the controversy over the execution of 
environmental activists in Nigeria. As this article was going to press, 
Nigeria's military government received widespread censure from the 
global community for hanging nine persons, including the well-known 
System As a Conceptual Framework for Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: NEW CHALLENGES AND DIMENSIONS 205 (Edith B. Weiss ed., 
1992); Dinah Shelton, Human Rights, Environmental Rights, and the Right to Environment, 
28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103 (1991); Dinah Shelton, The Right to Environment, in THE FUTURE 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION IN A CHANGING WORLD: FIFTY YEARS SINCE THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS ADDRESS, EssAYS IN HONOR OF TORKEL OPSAHL 197 (Asbjorn Eide & Jan 
Helgesen eds., 1991); Heinhard Steiger et al., The Fundamental Right to a Decent Environ-
ment, in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 1 (Michael Bothe ed., 1980); Melissa 
Thorme, Establishing Environment as a Human Right, 19 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 301 
(1991); Henn-Juri Uibopuu, The Internationally Guaranteed Right of an Individual to a Clean 
Environment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 151 
(Richard P. Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989); David A. Wirth, The Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development: Two Steps Forward and One Back, or Vice Versa?, 29 GA. 
L. REV. 599 (1995); Jennifer A. Downs, Note, A Healthy and Ecologically Balanced Environ-
ment: An Argument for a Third Generation Right, 3 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 351 (1993); 
James T. McClymonds, Note, The Human Right to a Healthy Environment: An International 
Legal Perspective, 37 N.Y.L. ScH: L. REV. 583 (1992); cf. World Charter for Nature, U.N. 
GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 23, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4 (1982); World Charter for Nature 
Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Agenda Item 21, U.N. Doc. A/37/L.4/Add.l (1982); see 
generally Andrzej Makarewicz, La protection internationale du droit a l'environnement, 
ENVIRONNEMENT ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 77, 79-82 (Pascale Kromarek ed., 1987). 
56. U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
57. See generally Dinah Shelton, What Happened to Human Rights at Rio?, 3 Y.B. 
INT'L ENVTL. L. 75 (1992); Wirth, supra note 55. 
58. Wirth, supra note 55. 
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playwright Ken Saro-Wiwa, president of a movement for the survival of 
the Ogono people.59 Saro-Wiwa was charged with involvement in the 
killings of four pro-government traditional chiefs during disturbances 
against the Anglo-Dutch oil giant Royal Dutch/Shell in May 1994. The 
Ogonos, an ethnic minority concentrated in southeastern Nigeria, ac-
cused the government of allowing the oil-rich communities, farms, and 
fisheries to be destroyed due to lack of environmental safeguards. Saro-
Wiwa stated that "[w]hat Shell has done is to wage ecological war 
against the Ogoni people."60 Five days after the executions, the Royal 
Dutch/Shell group announced that it intended to invest $3.5 billion in a 
natural gas plant in Nigeria.61 On December 14, 1995, the General 
Assembly's Social, Humanitarian and Cultural committee, by a vote of 
98 to 12 with 42 abstentions, condemned Nigeria's '.'arbitrary" execution 
of the nine activists.62 The United States and European Union introduced 
the resolution with nearly sixty additional sponsors.63 Voting against the 
resolution were China, which viewed the resolution as illegal interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of Nigeria under the guise of human rights, 
and a number of African countries.64 At that time, imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions by the Security Council appeared to be blocked by 
China's veto power.65 Unilaterally, the United States banned all military 
sales to Nigeria, extended a ban on U.S. visas to all members of the 
military and supporting civilians, and restricted Nigerian United Nations 
delegates to a twenty-five mile radius of Manhattan.66 The United States 
refrained from imposing a unilateral ban on imports of Nigerian crude 
oil, presumably because the effects would be felt 'by the population and 
not the military leaders.67 
If economic sanctions against Nigeria were placed on the Security 
Council's agenda, what would constitute the threat to peace? The politi-
cally motivated execution of nine individuals, although a denial of 
59. Stephen Buckley, Nigeria Hangs Playwright, Eight Activists, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 
1995, at AI. · 
60. ld. at A26. 
61. Daniel Southerland, Shell to Invest In New Nigeria Gas Venture, WASH. PosT, Nov. 
16, 1995, at A39. 
62. John M. Goshko, Nigeria Draws U.N. Censure For Executions, WASH. POST, Dec. 
15, 1995, at A30. 
63. ld. 
64. ld. 
65. ld. 
66. Thomas W. Lippman, U.S. Eschews Tough Measures In Wake of Nigeria Hangings, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 1995, at A2. 
67. Nations Rule Out Oil Sanctions Against Nigeria, WASH. PosT, Nov. 13, 1995, at 
A17. 
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human rights, would not be equivalent to the gross and systematic 
deprivation of human rights which have been the grounds for humanitar-
ian intervention by the Security Council in the past. If the predicate for 
economic sanctions is the underlying conflict between the Ogonos and 
the Nigerian government, that conflict is an "ecological war" as de-
scribed by Saro-Wiwa. Of course, nothing would preclude the Security 
Council from characterizing the threat to peace more cautiously as the 
gross and systematic deprivation of the political rights of the Ogonos in 
general, just as the undeniable human rights motivation behind sanctions 
against Southern Rhodesia in 1965 was initially cloaked in the more 
acceptable justification of potential military conflict. Nevertheless, the 
Nigerian incident and the Security Council's response (or non-response 
for that matter) demonstrates the inevitability of environmental disputes 
being thrust into the Council's province. 
The stumbling block to Security Council responsiveness to the 
Nigerian situation was the objection of the People's Republic of China 
that humanitarian concerns of any kind would be used to justify Security 
Council authority. To return to Paul Szasz's comments68 on the inappro-
priateness of environmental tasks for the Security Council, the veto 
power and, more broadly, the composition of the Council are problems 
which are superimposed on the entire range of issues which might fall 
within the Council's jurisdiction. To rework his analogy, the problem is 
not the inappropriateness of the instruments for the operation but the 
choice of doctors who decide on the patient's course of treatment. In an 
emergency situation, however, the patient cannot simply wait for the 
ideal decisionmakers to be assembled and authority to be distributed 
accordingly. As necessary and preferable as it might have been to have 
an international criminal court or explicit authorization of humanitarian 
intervention in Chapter VII, it was necessary for the Security Council to 
establish ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia and to 
act in those situations, as well as in Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq. China's 
restraint in the use of the veto in these precedents provides at least a 
glimmer of hope for the effectiveness of the Council in addressing 
environmental emergencies. 
Assuming that the Council is authorized to respond to environmental 
emergencies, what form might the response take? With emergencies, 
corrective action could be either remedial (as in requiring Iraq to com-
pensate for environmental damage) or punitive (as in imposing econom-
ic sanctions on Nigeria). Remedial measures would be those designed to 
68. See supra note 38. 
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rectify the effects of a single incident or discontinue a particular practice 
while punitive measures would be designed to compel discontinuance of 
environmentally destructive behavior. 
For punitive measures, economic sanctions under Article 4169 would 
be a likely response to environmental transgressions. Collective imposi-
tion of economic sanctions through the Security Council would obviate 
many of the practical and legal difficulties with the unilateral imposition 
of trade sanctions. Briefly, unilateral imposition of economic sanctions 
is permissible, if not prohibited, by the 1947 GAIT and Uruguay Round 
agreements which encompasses 125 countries (excluding, notably, the 
former Soviet Union and most of the Eastern bloc countries, China and 
Taiwan). Under the Uruguay Round agreements, environmental mea-
sures that are service and product-related are covered by the sanitary and 
phytosanitary regulations ("SPS Agreement"). In case of a violation of a 
relevant agreement, objecting states must resort to the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding ("DSU") procedures of the World Trade Organiza-
tion ("WTO") for imposition of economic sanctions. This dispute resolu-
tion system involves, progressively, direct bilateral negotiation, concilia-
tion, and finally a WTO panel determination with ultimate recourse to 
the entire WTO on the panel determination. If a state does not comply 
with an upheld panel determination that invalidated an economic sanc-
tion, the restricted state and other parties to the dispute are authorized to 
retaliate proportionately with trade sanctions. This whole system, from 
the first bilateral negotiation to a final WTO determination, may take 
twelve to eighteen months.70 
As widespread as participation in GATT and the Uruguay Round 
agreements is, its membership is not as inclusive as the membership in 
the United Nations, particularly given the notable exceptions mentioned 
above. Moreover, as expedited as the evaluative process now is under 
the Uruguay Round agreements, the process still takes too long to 
correct an environmental emergency that threatens significant and immi-
nent environmental disaster or military conflict. Finally, the procedures 
only apply to products and, to a much lesser extent, service-related 
environmental disputes- it does not encompass a wide range of envi-
ronmental disputes such as transboundary pollution, destruction of or 
disputes over allocation of a vital environmental resource, or loss of 
biological diversity. States would still retain the option of unilateral 
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 41. 
70. See generally Norio Komuro, WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: Coverage and 
Procedures of the WTO Understanding, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1995). 
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imposition of trade sanctions in accordance with their treaty obligations 
even if the Security Council did not decide to impose sanctions. 
The availability of economic sanctions through the Security Council 
would be a particularly effective remedy for environmental delinquen-
cies. Whatever effectiveness_ economic sanctions have in avoiding or 
terminating military conflict. or in remedying human rights violations, 71 
economic sanctions are potentially more effective as a deterrent or 
sanction in the environmental context (at least those that do not them-
selves involve potential or ongoing military conflict). Military conflict 
inevitably implicates security interests that defy economic quantification 
and which continue unaffected by economic deprivation. Economic 
sanctions for human rights ·violations. often harm only those whose rights 
they are meant to protect while leaving the offending power structure 
unchanged. National productivity of any kind at the expense of the 
environment, however, can be more easily translated into economic 
terms. Consequently, it is easier to tailor appropriate economic sanctions 
to deter or to punish the excessive or hazardous exploitation of resourc-
es. Although some environmental delinquencies will implicate vital 
security concerns even in the absence of real or potential military con-
flict (hazardous plutonium-producing nuclear reactors, for example), a 
wide range of environmental problems would fall outside of these more 
troublesome parameters. Moreover, this argument is not meant to sug-
gest that economic sanctions for environmental delinquencies are inap-
propriate or unworkable in the context of real or anticipated military 
conflict or when concrete national security concerns are implicated. It is 
meant only to acknowledge that in such circumstances concerns about 
the effectiveness of economic sanctions are the same as in a non-envi-
ronmental context. 
Remedial measures by the Security Council could range from rec-
ommending that member states provide assistance to alleviate the emer-
gency to requiring the state of origin to monitor, assess, report on, 
and/or redress the environmental damage through restoration of resourc-
es or financial compensation.72 Although at first glance it might seem 
unlikely that the use of force under Article 42 would be an appropriate 
response, there are conceivable scenarios, aside from environmental 
destruction threatening military conflict orin ongoing military conflict, 
71. Lori F. Damrosch, Recent Security Council Actions Concerning Internal Conflicts: 
Economic Sanctions, ASIL INSIGHT (Am. Soc'y of Int'l L., Washington, D.C.) Jan.-Feb. 
1994. 
72. For a description of United Nations monitoring and informational activities in 
environmental emergencies, see infra note 79. 
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in which the use of force might become necessary.73 Drawing from the 
Certain Expenses case,74 enforcement action under Chapter VII is char-
acterized by lack of consent. Placement of United Nations or United 
Nations-authorized personnel - military or technical - in a state with-
out its consent would arguably constitute enforcement action under 
Chapter VII. It has also been suggested that the Security Council could 
create subsidiary organs under Chapter .VII and Article 2975 of the 
Charter to deal with specific disputes, such as global warming/6 al-
though this ·methodology is more useful for norm-creating and adjudi-
catory functions than for responding to emergency situations.77 
In the event of an environmental disaster in which the victim state 
or states requests the assistance of the Security Council, the language of 
Chapter VI ("any dispute, or any situation which might lead to interna-
tional friction or give rise to a dispute")78 is even broader and more 
anticipatory than the term "threat to the peace" under Chapter VII. The 
Security Council has well established procedures for emergency sessions 
and in such circumstances could expeditiously recommend to member 
states provision of emergency assistance. The Security Council could 
also act as a clearinghouse for such emergency assistance, or designate 
another organ of the United Nations to supervise in an ongoing capacity 
73. For one such scenario, see Malone, supra note 42 (describing investigation by IAEA 
experts of the conditions at Chernobyl). . 
74. Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 150, 164 (July 20): 
75. U.N. CHARTER art. 29. 
76. Jose L. Fernandez, Global Warming Legislation: Putting the Carbon Genie Back In 
the Bottle, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1153-54 (1991). 
77. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is competent to adjudicate all international 
law disputes, including environmental disputes. The ICJ also has the authority to establish 
special chambers with specific expertise under Article 26(1). Advisory opinions may also be 
requested from the ICJ by the General Assembly and Security Council, as well as other duly 
authorized United Nations organs and agencies. U.N. CHARTER arts. 65, 96. The principal 
impediments, however, to utilization of the ICJ to resolve environmental disputes, are the 
difficulty in obtaining jurisdiction over state parties and the time-consuming process of 
adjudication. See Charles E. Di Leva, Trends in International Environmental Law: A Field 
With Increasing Influence, 21 ENVTL. L. REP. 10076, 10078 (1991). It has been suggested 
that a special environmental court be established by treaty or by the General Assembly. See 
id. at 10081-82. Although a number of. ICJ decisions have been influential in the devel-
opment of international environmental law, the Court now has the first truly environmental 
case to come before it involving Hungary and Slovakia: · 
78. U.N. CHARTER art. 34. Consensual utilization of the Security Council for peaceful 
settlement of environmental disputes under Chapter VI is consistent with the code of guiding 
principles for peaceful settlement of disputes over shared natural resources adopted by the 
UNEP Governing Council and the General Assembly. G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 34th 
Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 128, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/186 (1979); Draft Principles of Conduct in 
the Field of the Environment for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious 
Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States: Report of the Intergovern-
mental Working Group of Experts, U.N. Environment Programme, 6th Sess., Provisional 
Agenda Item 11, Annex at 13, U.N. Doc. No. UNEP/GC.6/17 (1978). 
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and coordinate the assistance provided by member states.79 The recent 
proposal to establish a rapid deployment force under Article 4080 could 
also be utilized as a model for a team of environmental disaster experts 
"on call" to the Security Council to assist in the interim period during 
which member states are organizing their own assistance efforts. The 
creation of such a team would be considerably less expensive than the 
creation of a new, separate organ. 
One limitation that applies to responsive measures under Chapter VI 
but does not apply to Chapter VII "enforcement measures" is Article 
2(7)'s prohibition on intervention in states' domestic jurisdiction.81 If a 
state consents to the measures of the Security Council under Chapter VI, 
then there is no problem of "intervention" under Article 2(7). If, howev-
er, the state in which the environmental problem originates is uncooper-
ative, the Security Council, instead of resorting to Chapter VII, might 
choose to issue precautionary and ameliorative recommendations for 
emergency response action applicable only in the territory of consenting 
states, but which could nevertheless be interpreted by the state of origin 
as "intervention" in its domestic jurisdiction. For example, routine 
monitoring or exchange of information on the transboundary effects of 
an environmental disaster, if taken pursuant to a Security Council rec-
ommendation that there be such collection and exchange of information, 
might be objectionable to the state of origin. In this regard, it is relevant 
to note that Russian counter-intelligence agents recently accused a 
79. With respect to momtonng and infonnation systems, UNEP, pursuant to its 
Earthwatch Programme, has established the Global Environmental Monitoring System 
("GEMS") in which four specialized agencies, the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources ("IUCN"), and over 140 states participate. UNEP is also 
responsible for INFOTERRA, an international clearinghouse for exchange of environmental 
infonnation, the International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals ("IRPTC"), and the 
International Programme on Chemical Safety ("IPCS") in conjunction with the International 
Labor Organization ("ILO") and the World Health Organization ("WHO"). See Szasz, supra 
note 31, at 343. 
80. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking 
and Peace-keeping, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, 'I! 44, U.N. Doc. A/47/277 
(1992); John H. Goshko, Boutros-Ghali Seeks Standby Force to Prevent Massacre in Burundi, 
WASH. PosT, Feb. 17, 1996, at A22; see generally Rosalyn Higgins, Peace and Security: 
Achievements and Failures, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 445, 451 (1995); AndrewS. Miller, Universal 
Soldiers: U.N. Standing Armies and th~ Legal Alternatives, 81 GEO. L.J. 773 (1993). 
81. Article 2(7) provides: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, <j[ 7. 
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"[w]estern ecological organization of divulging military secrets and ... 
suggested that foreign environmental groups are fronts for espionage."82 
Environmental disasters with transboundary effects, loss of a vital 
global resource, or actions in violation of international environmental 
law can no longer be regarded as matters of "domestic" jurisdiction. An 
interpretation of "domestic" jurisdiction that excludes environmental 
disasters with international ramifications is as consistent as the current 
widespread recognition that "domestic" jurisdiction does not encompass 
the large scale deprivation of basic human rights.83 Veto-holding states 
could block any unwelcome intrusion into what they perceive as their 
domestic concern. Although other countries would view this power as a 
drawback to recognizing Security Council competence in environmental 
emergencies (and rightly so), developing countries in particular could 
benefit from, rather than be disadvantaged by, Security Council assis-
tance, as the UNCUEA report indicates.84 Moreover, intervention in a 
truly domestic matter would in all likelihood fail to receive the required 
nine votes given the traditional geographical distribution of membership, 
regardless of whether the Security Council was acting pursuant to Chap-
ter VI or Chapter VII. It should also be noted that the Article 2(7) issue 
would not arise with respect to areas outside of any state's territory, for 
example, on the high seas,85 and, though less clear, in Antarctica. 
In the absence of collective United Nations machinery, the opportu-
nity for states to resort to self-help in an abusive and unprincipled way 
continues. Few authorities question that environmental issues and alloca-
tion of scarce natural resources will be a predominant issue on the 
82. Lee Hockstader, Ecologists Accused of Espionage, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 1995, at 
A26. 
83. See supra text accompanying notes 50--54. 
84. See supra text accompanying notes 10-22. 
85. On the high seas, the Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Case 
of Oil Pollution Casualties and its 1973 Protocol Relating to Pollution by Substances Other 
Than Oil already authorize states to take necessary measures to protect themselves from grave 
and imminent danger resulting from maritime casualties. Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, 970 
U.N.T.S. 212; Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 13 I.L.M. 605 (1974). Generally acknowledged 
as reflecting custom, this right of intervention could be the legal foundation for a Security 
Council recommendation that states exercise the right individually or collectively. The 
Security Council's authority in dealing with environmental emergencies on the high seas 
would enhance, not detract from, the new organizational framework for peaceful resolution of 
certain specified disputes under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which, as noted 
earlier with the ICJ, see supra note 77, is dependent upon the cooperation of the parties 
involved and inevitably time-consuming in its process. Moreover, the 1982 Convention lends 
support to the Security Council's less intrusive utilization of its Chapter VI powers by 
directing all states in Article 279 to seek peaceful resolution of disputes pursuant to Charter 
Articles 2(3) and 33(1). By offering the ICJ as one of the four fora for a binding resolution of 
disputes, the Convention also opens up the possibility of Security Council enforcement of ICJ 
decisions under Chapter VII, as authorized in Article 94(2) of the Charter. 
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international agenda for years to come. Unfortunately, as the report from 
UNCUEA indicates, the threat of future Chernobyls and Bhopals is 
increasing rather than lessening. However desirable it might be to create 
a new international organization to deal with environmental manage-
ment, the likelihood of such an organ at a time of severe budgetary and 
bureaucratic crisis within the United Nations seems highly unlikely. 
Whatever potential problems there might be for the Security Council as 
a norm-creating entity in environmental management, a critical first step 
in effective environmental regulation is that serious consideration be 
given to the Security Council as an organ for addressing environmental 
disasters. The revitalization of the Security Council engenders hope that 
the international community ·is suffiCiently mature to accept the Coun-
cil's expansion into environmental management86 - despite the continu-
ing and pervasive problems with the veto, the Council's membership, 
and fiscal constraints. 
86. Cf, Palmer, supra note 31, at 260 ("The Charter itself provides no environmental 
organ, an omission that would most certainly be rectified if it were being drafted today."). 
